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AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR
THE SEA-BED BEYOND NATIONAL
JURISDICTION
By THoMAS M. FRANCK* AND EVAN R. CHESLER**
A. INTRODUCTION
It is concern over the disposition and husbanding of the as yet only
faintly apprehended resources of the sea-bed beyond national jurisdiction
that impelled Ambassador Pardo of Malta to direct the attention of the
United Nations toward the concept of a "common heritage of mankind".
This resulted in the Declaration passed by the U.N. General Assembly on
December 17, 1970 which sought to establish the principle that the sea-bed
and its resources beyond national jurisdiction were not subject to unilateral
appropriation by any state or persons. Rather, the U.N. declared, this area
would be developed in acccordance with a new international regime to be
created by negotiation.'
The General Assembly thereupon moved to enlarge both the composi-
tion and mandate of its Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-
Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction and to
charge it with responsibility for convening a global conference on the law of
the sea which would deal with the establishment of an equitable international
regime - including international machinery - for the area and resources of
the sea-bed and ocean floor.3
This Preparatory Committee began meetings in Geneva in March and
July-August, 1971 and in New York in October, 1971. During the inceptive
year it elected the Sri Lanka Ambassador, Mr. H. S. Amerasinghe, as Chair-
man and divided its mission among three Sub-Committees. Sub-Committee I
was charged with the task of preparing
draft treaty articles embodying the international regime - including an inter-
national machinery - for the area and resources of the sea-bed and the ocean
floor, and the sub-soil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, taking
* Professor of Law, New York University and Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University; Director, International Law Program, the Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace.
** Junior Fellow, Center for International Studies, New York University School of
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This study was prepared under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace, and will be published as part of a volume of diverse papers on sea law
by the Institute of State and Law of the U.S.S.R. The views expressed are solely those
the authors.
I G. A. Res. 2749 (XXV).
2 The Ad Hoc Committee had been established by G. A. Res. 2340 (XXII) and its
mandate augmented by G. A. Res. 2467A (XXIII).
3 G. A. Res. 2750C (XXV).
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into account the equitable sharing by all States in the benefits to be derived
therefrom, bearing in mind the special interests and needs of developing coun-
tries... economic implications resulting from the exploitation of the resources
of the area... as well as the particular needs and problems of land-locked
countries... .4
Sub-Committee H1 was concerned with problems of the territorial sea and
the economical zone, while Sub-Committee III focussed principally upon the
marine environment. Already during this session of the Conference, the first
Sub-Committee had laid before it the thoroughly-formulated but radically
divergent views of various states and groups of states: a draft treaty prepared
by the United States,5 a working paper by the United Kingdom,6 proposals
by France,7 a Tanzanian draft statute for a sea-bed authority s Soviet draft
articles for a treaty,9 a Polish working paper,10 a Maltese draft ocean space
treaty,"1 a working paper submitted jointly by thirteen Latin American
states,' 2 a preliminary working paper introduced by seven land-locked, shelf-
locked and zone-locked ("geographically disadvantaged") states' s and a
Canadian working paper.' 4 As the rapporteur observed with considerable
understatement: "It was generaly accepted that the establishment of an inter-
national sea-bed regime should be based on the Declaration contained in
resolution 2749(XXV). But the various draft proposals and opinions ex-
pressed reflected different interpretations as to the nature of this relation-
ship."15
In the period 1971 to 1973, the First Committee,' 6 primarily under the
chairmanship of Paul B. Engo of the Cameroons and with a working group
headed by C. W. Pinto of Sri Lanka, succeeded in preparing an extensive
set of alternative texts for 52 articles of a draft sea law convention. These
again reflected sharply divergent views, but did at least present them in an
4 United Nations. General Assembly. Official Records: 26th Session. Suppl. no. 21
(A/8421). Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean
Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction at 5.
5 3 August 1970. United Nations. General Assembly. Official Records: 25th Session.
Suppl. no. 21 (A/8021), Annex V. For summary of discussion, see supra, note 4 at 17-18.
Old., Annex VI and supra, note 4 at 18-19.
7 Id., Annex VI and supra, note 4 at 19.
8 20 July 1971. A/AC.138/33 and supra, note 4 at 19.
9 27 July 1971. A/AC.138/43 and supra, note 4 at 20.
10,3 August 1971. A/AC.138/44 and supra, note 4 at 20.
115 August 1971. A/AC.138/53 and supra, note 4 at 20-21.
12 10 August 1971. A/AC.138/49 and supra, note 4 at 21.
's 20 August 1971. A/AC.138/55 and supra, note 4 at 22.
14 24 August 1971. A/AC.138/59 and supra, note 4 at 22.
It Supra, note 4 at 23-24.
'
6 The basic structure of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed
carried over into the Conference. Ambassador Amerasinghe, Chairman Engo and Mr.
Pinto simply assumed at the Conference positions analogous to those held during the
sessions of the Committee and the First Sub-Committee essentially became the First
Committee of the Conference, albeit with the enlarged membership of all participating
states.
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organized fashion suitable for serious negotiations.17 Thus, by the time the
first working session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea was convened in Caracas between June 20 and August 29, 1974, the
First Committee, in the view of one U.S. representative, "was far ahead of
the other Committees of the Conference."' 8
By the time the next meeting of the Conference had concluded in
Geneva, on May 9, 1975, another U.S. representative, Ambassador John N.
Moore, was moved to exactly the opposite conclusion. In his opinion, the
First Committee was now far behind the other two in progressing toward an
acceptable Universal Convention on Sea Law.' 9 The object of this paper,
therefore, is to examine the causes of this loss of momentum and to examine the
prospect of avoiding a situation in which an otherwise agreed universal con-
vention - which now appears within reach - with its substantial benefits for
all mankind, is allowed to founder on the issue of international regime.
It is important, at the outset, to note that Committee I's loss of
momentum toward an agreeable text is not due to indolence. At its plenary
meeting on April 18, 1975, the Geneva Conference requested the Chairman
of each of the three main committees "to prepare a single negotiating text
covering the subjects entrusted to his committee." 20 Chairman Paul Engo,
in a minor miracle of drafting zeal, did produce a complete text of 75 articles
and one annex - a remarkable feat considering the variety and dispersion of
views in his Committee. The difficulty with this draft, however, is that, to a
greater extent than those prepared by the chairmen of the other two com-
mittees, it represents one tendency - that of the Group of 77 or the De-
veloping Countries (actually now more than 100) - and fails to achieve a
workable reconciliation with the strongly held views of the United States, the
Soviet Union, Canada, Europe, Australia and New Zealand. These differences
extend over almost - but not quite - all the issues within the jurisdiction
of the First Committee.
B. THE AREA SUBJECT TO AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME
Fundamental to an agreed convention establishing a sea-bed regime is a
consensus on the area to be included. Such a consensus does not yet exist. A
study made in 1972 by the United States Geographer analyzes the areas that
would be allocated to each state if outer limits of national jurisdiction were
'7 United Nations. General Assembly. Official Records: 28th Session. Suppl. no. 21
(A/9021). Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean
Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, Vol. I, 13-60 and all of Vol. 11.
18 Louis B. Sohn, The Sea-Red Beyond National Jurisdiction and the Law of the
Sea (Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association,
21 February 1975, mimeo) at 2.
19 Interview with author, Washington, D.C., 19 May 1975.
20 United Nations A/Conf. 62/WP. 8/Part I (7 May 1975) at 1. Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Informal Single Negotiating Text. The Presi-
dent of the Conference has stated that this Single Text "should take account of all the
formal and informal discussions held so far, would be informal in character and would
not prejudice the position of any delegation nor would it represent any negotiated text
or accepted compromise"
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set, respectively, at 40 miles from shore, at 200 miles, at a depth of 200
meters and at the edge of the continental margin.21 Notably, the study showed
that the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada, Australia and Indonesia
stood to be five of the six top gainers among all the states under any of these
four options.2 2 The growing awareness of the fact that they could not lose
made both superpowers - originally reluctant to accede to the demand of
the Group of 77 for a 200 mile economic zone under national jurisdiction -
much less opposed to schemes for reducing the area of sea-bed under inter-
national jurisdiction.
The economic zone refers to that area of the sea directly adjacent to a
nation's coast, in which the country will have exclusive mineral resource
exploitation rights. The term must be distinguished from that of "territorial
waters", since the latter is tied to the notion of legal sovereignty.
Seven different off-shore limits of the economic zone have been discussed
by the Committee and Conference at various times: 40 miles, 200 meter
isobath, 200 miles, 500 meter isobath with a 100 mile minimum width, 3,000
meter isobath, 200 miles, and the edge of the continental margin. The
economic implications of some of these alternatives have been explored in
some detail. Which limit is adopted obviously affects the extent of resources
available to an International Regime. Under the 40 mile limit, 90 percent of the
world's proved off-shore hydrocarbon resources and 59 percent of ultimate as
yet unproved potential hydrocarbon reserves are believed to be within economic
zones. No known mine-grade manganese nodules would be within the na-
tional areas, and it is expected that rich mineral deposits (e.g. gold, platinum,
zircon, sulphur) will be exploited beyond the 40 mile limit in the future.23
In the case of the 200 meter isobath limit, about all the proved reserves and
68 percent of total potential sea-bed petroleum resources would be within the
economic zone. While no manganese nodules are located landward of the
200 meter isobath line, some of the minerals noted above will probably be
found within the zone.24 If a 3,000 meter isobath limit is used to define the
economic zone, all known reserves and 93 percent of potential hydrocarbon re-
sources will come under exclusive national control. Moreover, some quantities
of manganese nodules (albeit less abundant than at lower depths) and many
of the minerals listed above would also be within the national economic
zones.25 The 200 mile limit would embrace all known petroleum reserves
and approximately 87 percent of estimated total sea-bed hydrocarbon resources,
as well as about 10 percent of possible mine-grade manganese nodules, all of the
presently exploitable mineral resources and most of those having potential
21 Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Dept. of State, Limits in the Sea, - Theo-
retical Area Allocations of Sea-Bed to Coastal States, International Boundary Study, Ser.
A., No. 46 (12 August 1972).
22 Id. at 5-34.
23 United Nations, Report of the Secretary General. A/AC.138/87 (4 June 1973),
Economic Significance, in Terms of Sea-Bed Mineral Resources, of the Various Limits
Proposed for National Jurisdiction, at 33-34.
24 Id. at 34-35.
2 5 Id. at 36.
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economic value in the next few decades. 26 The edge of the continental margin
limit would include all potential hydrocarbon resources.
The first deduction to be drawn from this evidence is that under any
conceivable new global convention, the principal benefits will accrue to
already affluent states, including the U.S., the Soviet Union, Canada, and
Australia. Among the less developed, Indonesia, Argentina, Mexico and
Brazil (the wealthier of the poor) stand to gain substantially, while China,
Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines and India have high hopes of finding large
petroleum deposits in the sizable areas between their coasts and the edge of
the continental margin. Most other states probably stand to gain little.27
Landward of the 200 meter isobath line there may be as much as 1,544 bil-
lion barrels of oil. At a price of $5.50 per barrel, the aggregate value of these
reserves is $8,492 billion.28 However, thirteen nations with G.N.P.s greater than
$1,000 per capita have approximately 66.2 percent of this oil.29 In effect, no
conceivable economic zone agreement, despite its being the brainchild of the
less developed countries (prodded by the Latin Americans) is likely to have
anything but a re-enforcing effect on the present overall global disparity be-
tween the rich states and the poor, although it might incidentally make a few
of the poor less so. This outcome is, to a large extent, the fault of the poor
nations themselves. Instead of pressing for some system of general revenue
sharing in the huge windfall area that will constitute the economic zone, they
have instead focused their attention on establishing a regime favorable to
their interests in the area beyond national jurisdiction, even as the size and
economic importance of that area has continued to shrink with the full con-
sent of the Group of 77. This mismanagement of the less developed countries'
strategy is primarily attributable to the genius of a relatively small number of
broad-shelf and rich coastal fisheries states in their ranks - Brazil, Equador
and Argentina who were able to persuade the rest that their interest lay in the
direction of very broad economic zones established solely for the benefit of
the coastal state.
This attitude toward revenue sharing need not have been a foregone
conclusion. In 1970, the U.S. supported the notion of a worldwide renuncia-
tion of any sovereignty claims to the sea-bed beyond a depth of 200 meters. 0
Its draft treaty of August 3, 1970 envisioned the creation of "Coastal State
Trusteeship Areas" in the area beyond the 200 meter depth, embracing the
continental margins,31 in which revenue derived from sea-bed exploitation
would be equitably shared and in which the International Authority to be
261d. at 37-38.
2 7 For further discussion see: Franck, El Baradei and Aron, The New Poor: Land-
Locked, Shelf-Locked and Other Geographically Disadvantaged States (1974), N.Y.U.
Jour. International Law and Politics 33; Franck, Kennedy and Trinko, An Equitable
Regime for Sea-Bed and Ocean Subsoil Resources, 4 Denver Jour. International Law
and Policy 161.
28 Lewis and Levering, Use of Oil Revenue From the Present International Sea-Bed:
An Analysis of Alternatives (1974) at 1.
291d. at 2.
30 63 Dept. of State Bull. 209, 210 (1970).
31 Id. at 212.
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established by the Law of the Sea Convention would share rule-making juris-
diction with the coastal state. At this time, Canada, as another major broad-
shelf beneficiary, took an equally generous position, actually proposing in
1969 to share revenues from the entire area between the 12 mile territorial
sea and the continental margin . 2 When these proposals elicited no visible
response from the Afro-Asian states which would have stood to gain the
most, the position was quietly down-graded by the U.S. and abandoned out-
right by Canada.83 At Caracas, the United States indicated its willingness to
go along with the Group of 77 to accept a 12 mile territorial sea and a 200
mile economic zone, so long as these changes in the status quo were part of
a comprehensive package including freedom of navigation and overflight.34
The United States, like Canada, also indicated that where the continental
margin was more than 200 miles from shore, the coastal state's rights should
extend to the additional area.38
The Soviet position also evolved toward broader national - and com-
mensurately smaller international - areas of jurisdiction. At Geneva in 1973,
the Soviets had supported a 12 mile territorial sea s6 and a limit for the
economic zone at the 500 meter isobath (with a minimum of 100 miles from
the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured)Y3 At Caracas, the
Soviets, like the U.S., embraced an economic zone of 200 miles, contingent
upon reaching agreement on transit of straits and overflight as well as on
an agreed 12 mile limit for the territorial sea.38 France, too, at Caracas agreed
that "for reasons of simplicity and of fairness to the countries lacking a con-
tinental shelf, a distance criterion should be used" and "favoured a limit of
200 nautical miles from the baselines." 39
At their Spring, 1974 meeting in Nairobi prior to the Caracas session,
the members of the Group of 77 still found themselves basically grouped
around the 200 mile economic zone concept, but with some favouring an
option by the coastal state to extend its economic jurisdiction to the edge of
the continental margin where that was more than 200 miles from shore, while
still others, some of the land-locked, called for a less than 200 mile economic
zone or preferred it to be a regional, rather than a national zone.40 At Caracas,
an irresistable momentum emerged around the 200-mile-or-more limit and
when the issue was again taken up in Geneva in 1975, the overwhelming
majority of nations had formally lined up behind an economic zone of at least
32 Toronto Globe and Mail, 19 April 1975 at 7.
83 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 3d, Caracas, 1974. Official
Records (New York: United Nations, 1975), Vol. I at 97; R. M. Logan, Canada, the
United States, and the Third Law of the Sea Conference (1974) at 23. See, e.g., 119
House of Commons Debates 1st Session, 30th Parl. (1975) 101.
34 U.N. Conference, Id., Vol. I at 160.
35 71 Dept. of State Bull. 417 (1974).
80 Supra, note 17, Vol. III at 1.
87 Id. at 29.
8 8 Supra, note 33, Vol. I at 69, Vol. II at 221.
30 Id., Vol. I at 154.
40 Report of the Working Group Appointed to Prepare for the Nairobi Meeting
of the Group of 77 on the Law of the Sea (1974: mimeo) 5-7.
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200 miles, leaving open the question of any further extension to the edge of
the continental margin.
One ray of hope did emerge for salvaging something for the cause of an
equitable international system out of all this national aggrandization. The
unofficial working group of approximately 35 states convened by the Nor-
wegian Minister Jens Evensen early recognized during meetings in New York
in mid-February, 1975, that the idea of revenue sharing could be revived in
a limited way so as to gain general acceptance among all states for the claims
of broad-shelf nations to an economic zone incorporating the area between
200 miles and the edge of the margin: a distance which, in Canada's case,
could be as much as 600 miles off the Newfoundland coast.41 The U.S. con-
tinues to support some form of sharing in this area, proposing that it begin
in the sixth year of production at one percent of "wellhead market value",
rising to five percent after ten years. Canada, at the end of the 1975 con-
ference, has again accepted some form of revenue sharing in this area. Great
Britain has indicated a willingness to "look seriously" at sharing42 but
Australia, another broad-shelf state with a margin of up to 600 miles, has so
far refused to go along.
In any event, the international area has now been firmly forced back to
the sea-bed beyond the continental margins. While the draft text prepared by
the Chairman of the Second Committee at the end of the 1975 Geneva Con-
ference distinguishes between the regime of the Economic Zone and the
Continental Shelf,43 this could become largely a distinction without a differ-
ence as far as the regime of the shelf is concerned. The result would grant
exclusive "sovereignty" to coastal states over the continental shelf to "the
outer edge of the continental margin" for the purpose of "exploring and ex-
ploiting its natural resources". 44 It remains to be seen whether fisheries and
other jurisdictions (pollution control, etc.) will similarly be recognized as ex-
tending to the margin. There are reasonably good prospects that they will, with
revenue sharing as the quid pro quo.
In sum it appears that the international regime will be confined to an
area seaward of the 200 mile limit or of the edge of the margin, whichever
is the farthest from the coastline, and that its jurisdictional importance, range
of activities and revenues will, accordingly, be far less than had originally
been proposed by the initial U.S. draft treaty. On the other hand, it does
now again appear possible that there will be revenue sharing in the area be-
tween 200 miles and the continental margin, and, in the estimate of U.S.
authorities, even though only a few states would be required to make con-
tributions under such a project, the amount accruing from this source to the
International Authority would, for the foreseeable future, substantially ex-
ceed revenues derivable from the sea-bed beyond national jurisdiction.45 For
this reason a few delegations, the French in particular - even though their
41 Logan, supra, note 33 at 24.
4 2 Supra, note 32 at 7.
4 3 Supra, note 20 Part I at 27.
4 4 1d., Arts. 62, 63.
45 Supra, note 19.
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coastal configuration does not place them in the position of having to share
with the International Authority any part of their coastal production - are
opposed to the proposal because they fear that it would unduly strengthen
the Authority and make it too independent: a sort of world government of
the seas.40 To France, a continental margin revenue sharing scheme would
be acceptable only if it by-passed the International Authority and if revenues
derived from production were distributed directly by contributors to reci-
pients in accordance with an agreed formula laid down in the treaty. The
outcome of this unresolved issue will considerably affect the viability and
future development of an International Authority.
C. THE POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE AUTHORITY
The degree to which nations are willing to entrust independent super-
visory powers to the Authority is inversely proportional to individual na-
tional mining capabilities. Thus, the "capable" nations favour - at the most
- some form of licensing or contractor system, while the developing coun-
tries support a stronger Authority in which they can exercise a large degree
of control.4 7
The United States, Canada, the European Countries and Japan have
consistently pressed for freedom of exploitation under minimum conditions
of international standards and regulations while the developing countries
have wanted the International Authority, which they designate "the Enter-
prise", to have maximum powers. The U.S. favours a sea-bed mining system
in which access will be permitted under conditions favouring investment"
but has asserted that the Authority must have basic rights: to protect the
environment, accumulate data on matters relevant to its function, prevent
unauthorized exploitation, require that mining be carried out safely, develop
overseas training and technology transfer programs set up to benefit the
developing countries, insure against monopolies by a few developed states
and, itself, participate in the benefits of resource development. 49 Similarly,
the Authority should assume certain duties: to assure free, equal and non-
discriminatory access for all states to deep-sea resources and to provide
stable investment conditions. It should avoid needless regulation and protect
proprietary data,50 and its control should be limited to matters directly
related to the exploration and exploitation of sea-bed resources. 51 Initially,
the U.S., Japan and Western Europe wanted the Authority to be limited to
granting exclusive mining licences to natural and juridical persons 52 but the
U.S. has since begun to broaden its approach to include other, presumably
46 Interviews with members of the Evensen Group, New York, 20 February 1975.
47 For a comparative analysis of national positions see: Proposals Regarding Condi-
tions of Exploration and Exploitation, First Committee Working Group, 18 March 1975.
CP/Working Paper No. 2.
48 Law of the Sea: Third United Nations Conference at 6, (1974). (Reprinted from
the Dept. of State Bulls. of 15 April, 5 August and 23 September 1974).
49 ld. at 15.
SO Id. at 15-16.
51 ld. at 17.
52 Supra, note 47 at 7.
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more complex "legal arrangements" 53 perhaps including some forms of joint
venture.54 It prefers the Authority not itself to operate as a mineral exploiter
but to grant areas to state and private enterprises which, in the case of "hard
minerals" would not exceed 30,000 square kilometers - areas half the size
proposed by Western Europe.55 Lastly, the U.S. has favoured a treaty which
would set out quite specifically in an appendix the basic conditions ot
exploitation.5 6
The Soviet position is only to a limited extent different from that of the
U.S. The Soviets have supported a licensing system similar to that proposed
by Washington, but they would make lots for exploitation available only to
nations, not to private enterprises. 57 The Soviet Union has also pioneered
the idea of reserving lots for later exploitation by developing nations,58 a
proposal which has had a sympathetic hearing in the U.S. delegation and is
also supported by France59 and some other Western states. The French have
also pressed for very specific regulation of the terms of licensing and ex-
ploitation in the treaty itself - the term of years and the size and condition
of leases, for example, leaving less discretionary or rule-making power in
the organs of the International Authority.60
At Caracas, the Group of 77 submitted its proposal to the First Com-
mittee. It states:
All activities of exploration of the Area and of the exploitation of its resources
and all other related activities including those of scientific research shall be con-
ducted directly by the Authority. The Authority may, if it considers it appro-
priate, and within the limits it may determine, confer certain tasks to juridical or
natural persons, through service contracts, or association or through any other
such means it may determine which ensure its direct and effective control at all
times over such activities. 61
The Group of 77 thus strongly aligned itself with an International Authority
having wide powers to regulate all activities in the international area and
which would, itself, conduct exclusive mining activities through service con-
tracts with appropriate parties.62 The service contract approach was intended
by the 77 as a concession to the developed countries, 3 but they were careful
to provide that "direct and effective control" over all operations will remain
with the Authority at all times. 4 At Caracas, the 77 did offer to include
53 Supra, note 18 at 3.
54 Supra, note 19.
35 A/Conf.62/C.l/L/6, 13 August 1974 at 3.
56 Id.
5 7A/Conf.62/C.l/SR.8 at 9.
fs ld.
59 Supra, note 33, Vol. I at 155, Vol. II at 25.
6oA/Conf.62/C.1I/L.8, 16 (August 1974), Arts. HI, IV, VII, VIII and X.
61 A/Conf.62/C.1/L.3, Art. 9B.
62 Stevenson and Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea: The 1974 Caracas Session (1975), 69 American J. of International Law 1 at 8.
63 Supra, note 18 at 4.
64 Stevenson and Oxman, supra, note 62 at 9.
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certain provisions in the regime which were intended to placate the tech-
nologically advanced states. Contracts would be awarded on a competitive
basis. A contractor who fulfils the requirements of one stage would get
priority in later stages. The Authority would have the duty to ensure security
of tenure to a contractor, within the terms of the agreement. 5 But there is
much in the Group of 77 proposals that is left to the discretion of the Authority.
The size of the areas to be subjected to service agreements is not specified, nor
is the time span of the individual agreements. 6
Most private entrepreneurs would almost certainly be unwilling to
operate under so little protection. In particular, it is quite clear that the 77
see their approach as wholly unlike any form of licensing - an unacceptable
concept to the third world.67
The 77 further proposed at Caracas that any proceeds collected by a
nation through taxing an exploiting enterprise which is its national must be
paid to the Authority. If the state itself is the party to the service contract,
an equivalent amount will be paid. 8 The central role envisioned by the 77
for the Authority is underscored by several elements added to their position
at Caracas:
- Title to the international area, as well as to the resources in it,
should be inalienable and reside in the Authority; 69
- There must be no assignment of contractual rights without consent
of the Authority;70
- The Authority shall constantly be informed of all relevant data un-
covered by the contractor;71
- The Authority can take steps to ensure the efficient and timely per-
formance of service contracts;72
- A broad right of inspection is vested in the Authority.73
The Canadians, some Europeans and the Australians, seeking to re-
concile the approach of the 77 with that of other states, have suggested a
parallel licensing/direct exploitation system.74 Thus Australia has stated that
the Authority
should be empowered to enter into other contractual arrangements with States
and also to undertake exploration and exploitation on its own behalf when it had
accumulated the necessary resources and experience. 75
05 Supra, note 18 at 4.
06 A/Conf.62/C.1/L.7 (16 August 1974), ss. 3, 11, 15.
67 Supra, note 33, Vol. II at 56.
08 Supra, note 61, Art. 10(B).
69 Supra, note 66.
7 oSupra, note 33, Vol. H at 73.
71 Supra, note 47, s. 19.
72 Id., s. 24.
78 Id., s. 30.
74 Stevenson and Oxman, supra, note 62 at 7.
75 Supra, note 33, Vol. II at 7.
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Essentially, the developing countries fear that the U.S. and Soviet ap-
proaches would lead to all-out exploitation of mankind's last frontier by a
few technologically advanced nations to the exclusion of the vast majority.
The developed states, on the other hand, are concerned that the Group of 77
would set up an Authority controlled by the least advanced states with un-
limited authority to curtail production, control marketing, and discriminate
in their own favour in allocating mining rights and setting prices.
The Single Text drafted by the Chairman of the First Committee at the
end of the 1975 Geneva Conference sides decisively with the Group of 77's
views, despite some efforts at compromise. It establishes an operating Enter-
prise which, "subject to the general policy direction and supervision of the
Council" shall "undertake the preparation and execution of activities of the
Authority in the Area. ... -76 The Governing Board of The Enterprise is
to be heavily controlled by the Group of 77 with the seats being allotted half
to Africa, Latin America and Asia, one third to Eastern European and other
Socialist states and one sixth to Western Europe, U.S., Canada, Australia,
New Zealand and others.77 It provides for a Hydra-headed bureaucratic sys-
tem for administering the deep sea-bed including not only The Enterprise
and its Board, but an Assembly, Council, Economic Planning Commission,
Technical Commission, Tribunal and Secretariat. These are discussed below.
Within the area beyond national jurisdiction "all rights in the resources are
vested in the Authority"78 including all "title to the minerals or processed
substances derived from the area" except as provided by the Convention, the
rules of the Authority and the terms of the contracts made by the Authority.7
Exploration and exploitation "shall be conducted directly by the Authority"
or by states or by entities or persons sponsored by states to the extent that
the Authority, in its unfettered discretion, decides to share its monopoly.80
The Authority may also construct processing facilities and engage in trans-
portation or marketing."' It may "to the extent that it does not currently
possess the personnel, equipment and services for its operations" employ
outsiders on service contract.82 Marketing of its products is to be carried
out with a double standard: at not less than international market prices ex-
cept that lower prices may be charged to developing countries.s3 The Author-
ity may enter into joint ventures, but these must "ensure direct and effective
fiscal and administrative control by the Authority at all stages of opera-
tions .... ,,84 There is no provision for state or private exploitation of the
ocean floor except through a joint venture contract with the Authority. But
these joint-ventures do not approximate the concept as understood in the
capitalist states. The Authority is left essentially unfettered discretion in
76 Supra, note 20, Part I, Art. 35.
77 Id., Part I, Art. 27(1)(c).
7 8 Id., Part I, Annex I, Part A, Art. 1.
79 Id., Art. 2.
80 d., Art. 3 (b).
81 d., Part I, Annex I, Part B, Art. 4.
8 2 Id., Art. 4(d).
881d., Art. 4(e)(il).84 Id., Part. I, Annex I, Part C, Art. 6(b).
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awarding joint-venture contracts and setting their terms, except that "selection
from among the applicants shall be made on a competitive basis"85 taking
the Convention as a whole into account and preference shall be given to an
applicant who, pursuant to an earlier contract, is the discoverer.86 The maxi-
mum number of contracts any state may hold shall be the same for all nations,
regardless of size or level of technological development.87
There is nothing in the proposed rules to require the Authority to enter
into contracts with any parties anywhere. Contractors are required, in accor-
dance with their contract, to give the Authority access to all their secret data
to the extent "relevant to the effective implementation of the powers and
functions of the organs of the Authority. . . ."88 The Authority also would
have an unlimited right to inspect all facilities of a contractor in the Area. 9
Industrial enterprises contemplating this requirement will scarcely be com-
forted by the ensuing proviso that the "Authority shall not disclose to third
parties... such of the transferred data as is deemed to be proprietary by
the Contractor" 00 given the fact that the Authority, its Enterprise and
Secretariat, will be heavily staffed by persons who, if U.N. experience is any
guide, may be presumed to be reporting back to "third parties".
The discretion of the Authority to make rules and regulations is left
extremely wide by the Single Draft Annex, particularly as to the size of
contractually-allotted areas of exploitation and the length or renewability
of tenure. This virtually unlimited discretion may work well enough if its
effect is to cause the Authority and those with advanced technology to bar-
gain in good faith. On the other hand, there is a justifiable suspicion that the
developing countries would just as soon see sea-bed resources - which,
despite evidence to the contrary,91 they continue to see as dangerous com-
petitors to their own land-based resources - continue to go unexploited. If
so, the unlimited discretion to set terms would facilitate a "take-it-or-leave-it"
approach by the Authority to developers which would be anything but serious
arms-length negotiations.
On a more constructive note, the Single Text does provide that in the
event of a dispute between the Authority and the contracting party arising
out of the interpretation of the Convention, Contract, or Authority rules and
regulations, either party may invoke the dispute settlement procedures pro-
vided by the Convention.92 This provides, successively, for consultation,
negotiation, conciliation or other procedures chosen by the parties. If these
three alternatives fail to resolve the dispute within one month of its com-
mencement, "any party to a dispute may institute proceedings before the
8ld., Art. 8(c).
8old., Art. 8(e).
87 Id., Art. 8(f).
88ld., Art. 10(a).
80 Id., Art. 13.
00 Id., Art. 10(a).
91 For a study of this question, see supra, note 23. A revised version of this re-
port has been prepared for the Secretary General prior to the 1975 Geneva Conference.
92 Supra, note 20, Part I, Annex I, Part C, Art. 20.
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Tribunal, unless the parties agree to submit the dispute to arbitration...,.93
The judgments of the Tribunal shall be final and binding and enforceable in
the territories of Members as if awarded by the highest domestic court.94
But if the judgment goes against the Authority, there is no "domestic jurisdic-
tion" within which enforcement may be levied. It should be noted, also,
that the Single Text seems to contradict this wide grant of judicial review by
suggesting elsewhere that the Tribunal's jurisdiction to enter into contractual
disputes exists only where specifically provided by a contract.95 It also ap-
pears that the Soviet Union and several other states may not yet have ac-
cepted the proposed procedures for compulsory judicial settlement of dis-
putes.96 It may be, however, that it is the Western powers that ought to be
reluctant. Given the proposal that the judges be elected by the Assembly on
the recommendation of the Council (both to be controlled, if the Single
Text were adopted, by states not notoriously sympathetic to free enterprise)
and that their terms are for only five years, it is more than a little likely that
the Tribunal will reflect the dominant socio-political and economic assump-
tions of the numerical majority in the other organs of the Authority.97
D. THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
AND THE AUTHORITY'S STRUCTURE
Just as the dimensions of a satisfactory role for the Authority depend
on the size of the area under its jurisdiction, so, too, designing appropriate
powers and discretion for the Authority is closely related to the way power
is balanced within and among its organs. The American position is best
summarized in the words of Ambassador John Stevenson and Bernard Ox-
man, another U.S. representative to the Law of the Sea conference:
The best alternative is to agree on a Council that, in composition and voting
structure, sufficiently balances the substantive interests involved to inspire con-
fidence when coupled with precise and enforceable treaty limitations on the sub-
stantive scope of decisions.9 8
The Americans in 1970 suggested an Authority consisting of an Assembly, a
Council, and an operational arm and a dispute settlement body. The Assembly
would be responsible for broad policy guidance and would make decisions by
a majority vote of those present and voting.99 The Council would handle
executive decision-making with concentration on exploitation.10 0 It would
have 24 members, including the six most industrially advanced states, at least
twelve developing states and at least two land-locked or geographically dis-
advantaged states. Decisions by the Council would require triple majorities
93 Supra, note 20, Part I, Art. 57.
94 Id., Art. 59(1), (2).
9 51d., Art. 32(b).
9 6 1d., Settlement of Disputes, Annex I, IA, IB SD/2nd Session/No. 1/Rev. 5.
9 7 Supra, note 20, Part I, Art. 32(b)(5), (6).
98 Supra, note 62 at 11.
9 9 Supra, note 48 at 15; U.S., United Nations Convention on the International Sea-
bed Area (Draft submitted by U.S. Gov't), (1971), 2 Jour. of Maritime Law and
Commerce 451 at 458.
10oSupra, note 48 at 15.
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among all the members, the six industrially advanced states and the other
eighteen members.' 0 ' The dispute settlement body - or Tribunal - would
consist of five to nine judges elected by the Council. 02 Lastly, the United
States has suggested a rule-making procedure similar to that employed by
the International Civil Aviation Organization: rules would be drafted by a
specialized subsidiary organ, and after Council approval, forwarded to all
states for review. If after a fixed period, less than one-third of the members
have objected, the proposed rules would become binding. 03 As has been
observed, these proposals are light-years removed from those of the Group of
77 first circulated in a draft of January 1975 and February 1975.104 (An
earlier similar proposal had also been put forward by thirteen Latin American
states.' 0 5) The Group of 77 proposed that the Assembly be "the supreme
policy-making organ" with power to lay down general guidelines. It would
vote, in substantive matters, by two-thirds majority. 0 6 The Council would
be the executive organ of the Authority' 07 and would also vote, in sub-
stantive matters, by two-thirds majority. 08 Its membership would be elected
by the Assembly. Up to one-third of the places would be reserved for states
with "special interests" - half of these from among developed and half from
developing, nations. Among the former would be those with the most advanced
technology and sea investment as well as the major importers of the land-
based minerals also produced from the sea. Among the deVeloping states,
"special interests" would include the principal exporters of the land-based
minerals also found on the sea-bed, as well as the states with large popula-
tions and the land-locked and geographically disadvantaged. The principal
of geographical distribution would apply to election of both the special interest
and the general members of the Council. 0 9 In addition there would be The
Enterprise to explore, exploit, and enter into joint ventures"0 and a Govern-
ing Board of The Enterprise elected by the Assembly which would operate
by majority vote."'
The Soviet position, like the U.S., differs markedly from that of the 77.
In the Soviet version, there would be a Conference of all members and an
Executive Board of 30 members, elected on a geographically-allocated basis
with five for each of five regions 12 and one land-locked from each region."13
101 63 Dept. of State Bull. 209, 215 (1970).
102 Id.
1o Supra, note 48 at 17.
104 These memoranda were circulated privately and have no document number.
The February draft is referred to as the "Supplemental Draft Articles of the Working
Group of the Group of 77" and contains new drafts of Arts. 10, 22-24, 32-35.
1065 A/AC.138/49.
IN Supra, note 104, Art. 34.
107 Id., Art. 36.
108 Id.
109 Id., Art. 35.
110Id., Art. 38.
111 Id.
112 Socialist Countries, Asia, Africa, Latin America, Western Europe and others.
113 Supra, note 4 at 73.
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The Conference would take substantive decisions by a two-thirds majority 1 4
while the Board, wielding most specific powers, would proceed by consensus
in matters of substance."15
There are numerous variations on these themes. The Canadian proposal,
for example, calls for an Assembly - on which all members would be repre-
sented - empowered to approve budgets, elect members of its Executive
Body (the Council) and decide on matters referred by the Council. Assembly
decisions would be made by a two-thirds majority vote." 6 The Council
would approve mining and exploration regulations, manage marketing opera-
tions and oversee the distribution of benefits. In constituting the Council the
Canadian proposal utilizes classes of national interest: level of technology,
length of coastline, land-locked status, and level of economic development
and, not unexpectedly, size of continental shelf. Total membership would not
exceed 30, and decisions would be made by a two-thirds majority vote.117
Canada also proposed creation of a Secretariat - to report to the Council
and Assembly on the Authority's work and to collect and disseminate data,"18
and a Resource Management Commission with mixed operating and licensing
functions combining some elements of the U.S. and the Group of 77's pro-
posals. This Commission, notably, would be made up of experts who, among
other things, would issue licences, supervise and inspect mining operations,
enforce regulations, collect fees and royalties and regulate volume and method
of production." 9 Canada also proposed establishment of a dispute-settling
Tribunal, comprised of experts representing various legal systems and elected
by the Council or Assembly. Alternatively, disputes could also be settled
by the peaceful means set out in Article 33 of the U.N. Charter. Appeals
from Tribunal could go to the International Court of Justice (I.J.C.). 120
As with the allocation of functional responsibility to the Authority as a
whole, so in the instance of the Authority's institutional structure, the Single
Text prepared by Chairman Paul Engo leans precipitously towards the
preferences of the Group of 77. Between now and the resumption of the
conference in New York in 1976, much hard bargaining will be required to
accomplish something approximating an agreed text.
The Single Text proposes establishment of an Assembly, Council,
Tribunal, Enterprise and Secretariat.1 21 The Assembly, consisting of all mem-
bers, is allocated powers exactly as set out in the January-February 1975
draft of the 77.=- It is specifically given control over revenues and budgets
and has a mandate to adopt the criteria, rules and regulations for "the equitable
114 Id. at 72-73.
"15 Supra, note 18 at 7.
116 Supra, note 4 at 219.
117 Id. at 219-20.
118 d. at 220-21.
119 Id. at 221-22.
120 Id. at 222.
-
21 Supra, note 20, Part I, Art. 24.
122 Id., Art. 26.
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sharing of benefits derived from the Area and its resources ... -"123 In this
connection, it should be noted that the Single Text is quite unclear as to
whether the expenses of the Authority constitute a first charge on all income
derived from licensing, joint ventures and other operations. 124 The Council
is to be the "executive organ" as proposed in the 77 draft. It shall implement
the "apportionment of benefits derived from activities in the Area" on the
basis of the rules laid down by the Assembly, and it will have power to
supervise the activities of The Enterprise and to approve and supervise
contracts.J25 It shall consist of 36 members, one-third to represent "special
interests" as set out in the proposal of the 77, and two-thirds to be dis-
tributed, four each, among Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Socialist states,
Latin America, and Western Europe and others.126 This differs from the
proposal of the 77 only in adding a category of "socialist" in addition to that
of Eastern Europe - an addition quite unacceptable to the Western states,
a substantial number of which, including the U.S., Australia and Canada, are
left to scramble for a place among the "others" sub-category of "Western
European and others." As already noted, the same eccentric "geographic"
allocation is also applied by the Single Text to the important Governing Body
of The Enterprise.
The proposal of Chairman Engo's Single Text regarding The Enterprise
has already been discussed above, as has the draft concerning The Tribunal.
E. MODES OF RECONCILING DIVERSE PROPOSALS
ON THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME
Regime
The disagreement over the scope and method of operations by the Inter-
national Authority could delay or even frustrate agreement regarding the
convention of the law of the sea as a whole. It is therefore essential for all
sides to begin to negotiate this issue seriously and in a spirit of compromise -
something which has not yet occurred in the First Committee.
Both the developed and the developing nations, as well as the Single
Text, have accepted the "joint venture" concept, and it is from this nominal
agreement that a substantive consensus may yet be built. The concept of
"joint venture" defined in the Single Text does not, however, embody such a
compromise and constitutes little more than sub-contracting of functions
essentially reserved to the Authority. A genuine compromise would reserve
to the Authority or The Enterprise overall control within specified guidelines
as to matters pertaining to the environment, safety, and the awarding of
exclusive contracts. Beyond that, joint venture contracts should contain cer-
tain standard provisions permitting the state or private enterprise, as con-
tractee, to operate without administrative or other intervention by the Author-
ity except in instances where the contract is being violated -- a matter to be
123 Id., Art. 26(2)(x).
124 Id., Arts. 42-45.
125 Id., Art. 28.
120Id., Art. 270)(c).
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determined by the Tribunal. In other words, the benefits derived from the
joint venture would be divided between the parties in accordance with the
terms of the contract, while the administration of the venture, subject to
applicable provisions of the Convention, would rest with the contract-holder.
The Convention would also have to provide with greater certainty than at
present that a party authorized to explore would have an option to develop,
and that a developer would have reasonable security of tenure with an option
to renew under conditions reasonably within the original expectations of the
parties. The proviso for unilateral revision or termination of contract by
The Enterprise "in case of radical change in circumstance"' 27 will have to be
tightened up.
The joint venture concept does not exclude the possibility that a cor-
tracting state or private entrepreneur may agree to pay The Enterprise its
share of profits in a joint venture by providing other services to The Enter-
prise. Thus a typical joint venture exploitation agreement could conceivably
include a proviso by which the state or private contracting party agreed to
exploit two adjacent blocs of sea-bed, one as lease-holding operator with sole
operational responsibility and the other as The Enterprise's sub-contractor
operating under its direction. In the first bloc, the participation of The
Enterprise would be limited to profit sharing. In the latter, its participation
would be tantamount to operational control. The Authority's profits from
its share in the former - which would presumably be put into production
first - would thus be available to pay for the delivery of sub-contracted
services in the development of the latter.
The prospects of achieving some such compromise between the tech-
nologically underdeveloped majority and the only states capable, within the
foreseeable future, of exploiting the deep sea-bed, depends upon achieving a
further compromise on institutional arrangements for governing the activities
of the Authority in general and The Enterprise in particular. The key to such a
compromise is the principal organ of the proposed Authority, its Council.
One proposal, made by Professor Louis Sohn, is as follows:
In view of the constant increase in the size of international councils, it is quite
likely that a relatively large Seabed Council would be created. The figure of 48,
proposed by Kenya, coincides with the number of members of the General Com-
mittee of the Law of the Sea Conference, which was finally agreed upon after a
considerable discussion. If the distribution of seats in that Committee were fol-
lowed, Africa would get 12 seats, Asia also 12, Latin America 9, Western Europe
9 and Eastern Europe 6.
Within these numbers a few permanent seats might be reserved for some countries.
To avoid the stigma of inequality, equal numbers of such seats might be provided
for the major developed countries and for the major developing countries. While
the first ones might be chosen on the basis of gross national product, the second
ones might be chosen on the basis of population, three from each developing region.
In any case, to protect the interests of all major groups, a high majority should
be required, for instance five-sixths. In view of recent difficulties about some so-
12 7 Supra, note 104, Art. 38(3). The matter has been left for further study by the
Single Text, supra, note 20, Part I, Annex I, Art. 15.
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called "procedural" decisions, it might be desirable to apply this majority to all
decisions, without any distinction between substantive and procedural decisions.' 28
F. LONG-RANGE PROBLEMS
It is already possible to foresee the kinds of problems which would
become central concerns of the Authority once an international regime for
the exploitation of the sea-bed has been established.
1. Sourcing and Redistribution of Revenues
There is no single formula agreed on either for assessing the costs of the
proposed Authority or for redistributing such profits as it may eventually
derive. The matter of profit redistribution is likely to become important early
rather than late if revenue sharing becomes applicable to the outer con-
tinental margin beyond 200 meters and if those shared revenues are made
payable to the Authority. A simple formula proposed by the authors and
pursued with some success by the Ambassador of Singapore in the Evensen
forum would confine itself to two variables, population and poverty:
Average per capita income of world Population of state
X _ X 100
Average per capita income of state Population of world
There is much to be said for an agreed allocation. formula since an annual
pie-splitting contest within the organs of the Authority could plunge that
organization into bitter factionalism.
It should also be clarified that the general expenses of the organization
constitute a first charge on the income of The Enterprise and of the Authority
as a whole, if only to prevent the development of a sea-monster bureaucracy
financed by annual assessments.
2. The Rate of Exploitation
Even if the Convention makes adequate provision for joint ventures
under defined operating conditions, it will still, to some extent, be up to the
Authority to control the rate at which areas of the sea-bed enter into produc-
tion. It will presumably be the Authority which can create reserved areas
specifically set aside for future production by the developing states. Moreover,
the Authority will be in a position to decide when to let contracts for the
exploration and exploitation of specified areas. While there will be some
pressure on the Authority and The Enterprise to authorize production - not
only from the technologically advanced and industrial states but also from
populous and poor states that would stand to benefit from the redistribution
of The Enterprise's income - it must also be expected that there will be
countervailing pressures to delay exploitation indefinitely.
The debate on this point to date is instructive in considering the long-
term problems. Two reports on this subject have been prepared by (for) the
128 Supra, note 18 at 8.
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Secretary General of the U.N. The major differences between the two studies
may best be underscored by a brief listing of the central propositions of each:
The First Report states that:129
- Manganese nodules are the most likely deep-sea minerals to be ex-
ploited in the foreseeable future.
- Enough is now known to permit commercial exploitation (in the
Pacific and Indian Oceans - especially in the central Pacific
region).
- Significant technical problems are being encountered in dredging
and pumping minerals to the surface.
- A detailed comparative study of marine versus land-based mining is
not yet practical, largely because of the lack of publicly available
cost information, the immaturity of the marine mineral industry
which results in higher costs, and questions concerning the future
extent of regulation. However, it is believed that mining is viable
and can begin as soon as 1976.
- The likelihood that marine mining will commence depends largely
on: whether firms feel that they are technologically ready, whether
they believe that the legal setting is "safe" and whether they have
adequate financing.
- It is predicted that by 1985, six groups will be mining marine
minerals, involving a total volume of about 15 million tons.
- Nickel will be the "mainstay" of deep sea-bed mining, with copper,
cobalt and manganese obtained as by-products.
- Nickel production should experience a minimum long-term growth
rate of six percent per annum, and nodule production may account for
eighteen percent of total world demand by 1985.
- Developing countries now account for thirteen percent of world nickel
production and are increasing rapidly as principal suppliers. This will
have a substantial impact on the industry, "but it should not have a
serious effect on land-based production as a whole".
- The world market for copper is about fourteen times that for nickel.
Nodule production of copper is expected to have a small impact on
the large, growing copper industry.
- The market for manganese is small, and therefore nodule produc-
tion will probably depress prices. This may hurt earnings of present
producers. Many of these are developing countries, although only
one such producer depends heavily on these revenues.
- Cobalt is an expensive, lightly-used metal. By 1985, nodule produc-
tion may account for half of the world demand. Prices may decrease to
approximately two-thirds of present levels.
- By 1985, if maximum production is permitted, sea-bed mining might
account for 66 percent of cobalt demand and 28.6 percent of world
nickel demand. The impact of sea-bed development could be quite
substantial in terms of the interests of developing nations.
129 A/Conf.62/25.
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The Second Report, while agreeing with the First Report's estimate of
the effect on cobalt production, holds that: 8 0
- The probable impact on manganese prices is still uncertain, since
several potential miners are doubtful whether the recovery of this
mineral will be economically viable. Nickel production from nodules
will probably only help to counter the steady trend of price increases
for this metal around the middle of the next decade. Copper prices
are not expected to be much affected by nodule mining since supply
from this source is likely to account for only 1.3 percent of the world
demand by 1985.
- It is obvious from the interrelation of variables in the impact model
that decreases in metal prices would act as a brake to the further
expansion of the nodule industry.
- Developing countries, with just one exception, are not highly de-
pendent on the exports of these minerals. By the end of the next
decade nodule mining might exert a downward pressure on nickel
prices, affecting a few developing countries; the countries in ques-
tion, however, are not highly dependent on nickel exports.
- If the impact of nodule mining is expected to be rather moderate
for both producers and consumers for the foreseeable future, who
will benefit most from this new industry? The answer is obviously
the world community at large and the advanced countries possessing
nodule technology in particular.
The United States' position has essentially been that it is in the interests
of all consumers to encourage sea-bed mineral production. It is further
claimed that appreciable decreases in existing producer income are unlikely.' 81
The U.S. argues that increases in copper demand will greatly exceed the rate
of development in sea-bed production. Nickel presents a similar picture, and
manganese production from the sea-bed is presently unlikely. Thus, says the
U.S., it is only with respect to cobalt that a significant adverse impact on
developing nations may result from sea-bed mining operations. In this case,
appropriate relief (e.g., a compensation scheme) could be fashioned.'3 2
It is the U.S. view that production restrictions, multi-lateral commodity
agreements and compensation plans will all force mineral prices up.88 Since
only a small number of developing countries are producers of nickel, copper,
cobalt, and manganese, 8 4 such price increases would primarily benefit the
developed countries. Moreover, because sea-bed mining will account for only
a small proportion of total world production of these minerals, its restriction
would not effectively stabilize (or increase) the revenues of land-based pro-
ducers.' 86 In any event, the real losers in any attempt to restrict sea-bed
180 A/Conf.62/37.
181 Stevenson and Oxman, supra, note 62 at 10.
18 2 Supra, note 48 at 16-17.
183 A/Conf.62/C.1/L.5 at 8-9, C.l/SR.9 at 15-16.
184 Id., L. 5 at 1.
185 Id. at 10.
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mineral production will be the consumers, including the peoples of the de-
veloping countries who depend on capital goods made with these minerals.' 8 6
Lastly, the United States supports the notion of non-discriminatory access
to the sea-bed's resources.'8 7
The 77, on the contrary, are most concerned that prices paid to land-
based producers be protected. Fluctuations must be minimized while re-
sources are developed through a system of comprehensive control. s
Similarly they argue that the benefits of sea-bed exploitation should be
equitably distributed, with special concern for the developing countries. 18 9
While the Group concedes that a majority of developing countries would
benefit from decreased prices that would likely result from increased resource
supply,140 the members are quick to question the accuracy of U.N. studies
which minimize the negative impact of sea-bed mining. In these conflicting
concepts, which are unlikely to be resolved in any but the most general way
by the Convention, lies another important source of future disagreement.
3. Creeping Jurisdiction
All institutions to some extent suffer (or benefit) from a tendency to-
ward self-aggrandizement. There is no reason to expect an International
Authority for the High Seas and Sea-Bed to behave differently. The Single
Text, however, leaves ajar the door to virtually unlimited expansion. It
visualizes power for the Authority not merely to manage resources but to
control all activities in the area beyond national jurisdiction.' 41 Specific
authority is given to control pollution,14 effect technology transfer to de-
veloping countries,148 control scientific research 44 and more generally, to
regulate "activities in the area" which is defined to include not only explora-
tion and exploitation of resources but also "other associated activities...,.145
On the other hand, the "area" is defined specifically to exclude the water
column and the superadjacent air space. 146 The prevention of pollution from
sea-bed mining, however, implies some responsibility for the eco-system of
the sea column, since this is where pollution damage is likely to occur.
14
There are, moreover, various national proposals for the creation of interna-
tional regulatory mechanisms to prevent sea-pollution by ships' 48 and to
136 Id. at 6, 10.
137 Dept. of State Publications 8781 at 5 (1974).
13 Supra, note 33, Vol. 11 at 61.
139 Supra, note 61, Art. 10(B).
14o Supra, note 33, Vol. II at 61.
141 Supra, note 20, Part I, Art. 21.
142 Id., Art. 12.
143 Id., Art. 11.
44 Id., Arts. I(ii), 10. V
-145 ld., Arts. 6, 1 (ii).
146 Id., Arts. 2(1), 15.
147 See: Doeke Eisma, "Impact of Deep Sea Nodule Mining on the Ocean Life
System", in Ocean Resources and the Ocean Environment, Sierra Club International
Series No. 3 (1974).
1348 For the U.S. proposal which puts forward the possibilty of utilizing IMCO, see
supra, note 48 at 7.
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preserve living resources149 in the area beyond national jurisdiction. While
it has not so far been proposed that the International Authority expand its
regulatory functions to include the regulation of such shipping and fishing
activities in the sea column above "its" sea-bed, it is not inconceivable that
it might be a more appropriate agency for these purposes than the Intergovern-
mental Maritime Consultative Organization (I.M.C.O.), the Food and
Agriculture Organization (F.A.O.).
4. Conflict with Coastal States
While there is as yet no indication that oil, gas or other mobile sub-
stances can be extracted from the deep sea-bed beyond national jurisdiction,
it is perfectly conceivable that problems of encroachment on mutual fields
might arise between the Authority and coastal states' economic zones and
continental shelves. Even more futuristically, a state might construct traps or
barriers along the edge of its shelf or zone to prevent the "flow" of nodules
or other surface mineral deposits to the deep sea. Problems of this sort are
touched upon, but scarcely resolved by the Single Text's provision that
activities in the International Area "with respect to resources in the Area
which lie across limits of national jurisdiction, shall be conducted with due
regard to the rights and legitimate interests of any coastal State across whose
jurisdiction such resources lie". 10 This provision is much weaker than others
considered by the First Committee at Geneva in 1975, which stated that re-
sources of the Area "which lie across limits of national jurisdiction shall not
be explored or exploited except in agreement with the coastal State" and
that where the resources of the Area are located near the boundary of na-
tional jurisdiction, exploration and exploitation shall be carried on "in con-
sultation" and "where possible through such State . . .".151 Even more
remote, but still relevant, are potential problems of faulting and subsidence
which could occur on the continental shelf (or even more remotely, the
territory) of a coastal state as a result of mining activities carried on in the
Area. The Single Text merely provides for liability on the part of states,
corporations or international organizations which "cause damage" by carry-
ing on activities in the area not in conformity with the provisions of the
proposed Convention 152 - a non-absolute definition of liability insufficient
to cover other forms of damage caused by activities carried on in conformity
with the Convention.
There are also likely to be legal problems pertaining to the recovery of
historical treasures from the sea-bed.153 It has been pointed out, for example,
that in 1959-61 the warship of King Gustav II Adolph was recovered after
140 The U.S. proposal for draft articles on living resources of the high seas was
circulated 23 August 1974: A/Conf.62/C.2/L.80.
150 Supra, note 20, Part I, Art. 14(1).
151 Supra, note 61, Rev. 1.
252 Supra, note 20, Part I, Art. 17.
153 See: Stanislaw Matysik, "Legal Problems of Recovery of Historical Treasures
from the Sea-Bed" in Maria Frankowska (ed.), Scientific and Technological Revolution
and the Law of the Sea (Polish Academy of Science Institue of Legal Science: 1974).
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over 300 years on the sea-bed and now constitutes the "biggest tourist attrac-
tion of Stockholm".154 The Single Text would make the disposition of wrecks
more than 50 years old subject to the regulation of the Authority and appears
to give that Authority an option either to "preserve or dispose" of such ob-
jects "for the benefit of the international community as a whole", albeit giv-
ing "particular regard" to the "preferential rights" of the country of cultural
or historical originm'O
Finally, of considerable practical importance among futurological issues
is the question of amending the Convention after its coming into force. Under
the draft prepared by Chairman Engo, amendment by the majority would be
so easy - a vote of two-thirds of the Assembly present and voting and
ratification by two-thirds of the states parties to the Convention"0 - as
to put in doubt the usefulness of preparing a written document with long-term
guarantees. The key to an agreeable amending process will probably have to
be the participation of a Council voting along lines of a concurrent triple
majority of all its members and of representatives of both technologically
advanced and developing state members. A subsequent requirement for a
four-fifths majority in the Assembly and ratification by four-fifths of the
parties to the Convention would provide some guarantee against the rapid
disintegration of the international regime once established.
1541d. at 141.
155 Supra, note 20, Part I, Art. 19(1).
I6 Id., Art. 63.
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